Hawaiian Martial Law in the Supreme Court by Anthony, J. Garner
HAWAIIAN MARTIAL LAW IN THE SUPREME COURT
J. GARNER ANTHONY*
THE decision of the Supreme Court in the Hawaiian martial law
cases I holding invalid military trials of civilians in Hawaii was a salu-
tary one. 'While it is of particular interest to lawyers, political scientists
and historians, it is of general interest to every thoughtful citizen who
believes that the constitutional safeguards of civil liberties are as im-
portant in time of war as in time of peace.
History demonstrates that the safeguarding of our civil liberties in
time of war is more important and incidentally far more difficult than
in less troublesome times. 2 No one in time of peace would be impris-
oned without a trial or convicted otherwise than in conformity with
the Bill of Rights or denied his freedom of religion or freedom of speech.
Yet in time of war there will always be zealous and well-meaning souls
who would rashly abandon the civil liberties of the individual under
the guise of aiding the war effort. Such efforts usually have the ap-
proval of the crowd and sometimes the courts.3 This decision, coming
as we enter the threshold of the atomic age with.the realization of the
revolutionary methods.of modern warfare still fresh in mind, is signifi-
cant. It may serve as a warning for the future that the seizure of civil
government by the military authorities in the absence of invasion or
rebellion will not receive the sanction of the highest court in the land.
The problem posed by these cases has been the subject of comment in
legal periodicals which affords a background for the problem involved. 4
In order that the decision of the Supreme Court may be placed in its
proper framework, a summary of the events in Hawaii leading up to
it is in order.
* Member, Hawaii Bar. The author was counsel in the litigation here discussed, suc-
cessfully challenging the validity of Hawaiian martial law before the Supreme Court.
1. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U. S. 304 (1946) and its companion case, White v.
Steer, were argued and decided the same dates.
Z In Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1, 19 (1942), Chief Justice Stone recognized that
"the duty ... rests on the courts, in time of war as well as in time of peace, to preserve
unimpaired the constitutional safeguards of civil liberty...
3. CuAFEE, FroE SprxcH r THE UxnIED STATEs, ix (1941) : "When war begins,
all thinking stops."
4. Fairman, The Supreme Court on Military Jurisdiction: M3artial Rule in Hawaii
and the Yanuzshita Case, 59 HIv. L. Rsv. 833 (1946) ; Frank, Ex Parte Milligan v. The
Five Companies: Martial Law in Hawaii, 44 CoL. L. REV. 639 (1944) ; Anthony, Martial
Law, Milifary Government and the Writ of Habeas Corpus in Hawai, 31 CAuv. L. REv.
477 (1943) ; Ranldn, Hawaii under Martial Law, 5. J. PoL. Eco.N. 270 (1943) ; Arm-
strong, fartial Law in Hawaii, 29 A.B.A.J. 693 (1943) ; Radin, Martial Law and the
State of Siege, 30 CALIF. L. REv. 634 (1942) ; King, Legality of Martial Law in Hawaii,
30 CAIIF. L. Rnv. 599 (1942); Fairman, Law of Martial Rule, 55 -LHnv L. RE%. 1253
(1942) ; Anthony, Martial Law in Hawaii, 30 CALi'. L. Rnv. 371 (1942).
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In 194q, the civil population in Hawaii was aware of the imminence
of war in the Pacific. A plan of action in the event of emergency was
drafted. Early in 1941, the Board of Supervisors of Honolulu passed
an ordinance I declaring the existence of an emergency and creating a
"Major. Disaster Council" charged with the duty of administering and
coordinating certain essential civilian activities.
In February 1941, the Hawaiian Legislature met in its regular ses-
sion, debated the enactment of an M-Day law but adjourned without
its adoption. On September 15, 1941, the Legislature was called into
special session by Governor Poindexter for the purpose of enacting
legislation which would grant extraordinary powers to the governor
for use in the event of war. Governor Poindexter addressed the Legis-
lature pointedly:
"That we will be drawn into the actual hostilities is an appre-
hension which all of us share, but which we must face with courage
and determination....
"I recommend the enactment of a measure which will make suit-
able and adequate provision for the immediate and comprehensive
designation and delegation of powers which, under normal times,
would be unnecessary in a democratic form of government. . . .". 8
Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, commanding general of the
Hawaiian Department, appeared before the Senate of Hawaii and
stressed the urgency of appropriate legislative enactment in advance
of hostilities:
"Many of these things can be done better by the civil authori-
ties than by the military authorities, even after we possess the nec-
essary powers to execute them. Many of them even after the dec-
laration of martial law the military authorities would call on the
civil authorities to perform. The proper action at this time might do
much to delay or even render unnecessary a declaration of martial
law ...
"The essential legislation to provide this protection is entirely a
function of the government and the legislature. The military au-
thorities have no place in such action. If we tried to prescribe ac-
tion we would be invading the public affairs of the civil authori-
ties." I
The Hawaii Defense Act 8 which the governor and the commanding
general advocated speedily passed both houses of the Legislature and
was approved October 3, 1941. It vested in the executive sweeping
5. HoNoLULu REvV. ORB. § 746 (1942).
6. HAw. SEN. JouR. (1941) Spec. Sess. 14.
7. Minutes, Sen. Com. of the Whole (Sept. 17, 1941).
8. HAw. REv. STAT. c. 324 (1945).
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powers over the inhabitants of Hawaii and their property, powers ade-
quate to meet any emergency limited only by minimum safeguards to
the rights of the individual. No state in the history of the nation had
previously enacted so complete a delegation of power to the executive.
Thus the machinery was at hand to be used in the anticipated crisis,
but it was rejected for a more dubious alternative.
On December 7, 1941, a few hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor,
the governor of Hawaii issued a proclamation invoking the powers con-
ferred on him by the Legislature under the Hawaii Defense Act. Later
on the same day he issued a proclamation placing the territory under
martial law and suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to Section 67 of the Hawaiian Organic Act which provides:
"The governor shall be responsible for the faithful execution of
the laws of the United States and of the Territory of Hawaii ...
and he may, in case of rebellion or invasion, or imminent danger
thereof, when the public safety requires it, suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus or place the Territory, or any part there-
of, under martial law until communication can be had with the
president and his decision thereon made known." 9
The governor in his proclamation 10 not only suspended the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus and proclaimed martial law but went be-
yond the provision of Section 67 by proclaiming:
".... I do hereby authorize and request the Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department, during the present emergency and until the
danger of invasion is removed, to exercise all the powers normally
exercised by me as Governor; And I do further authorize and re-
quest the said Commanding General . . . during the present emer-
gency and until the danger of invasion is removed, to exercise the
powers normally exercised by judicial officers and employees of this
territory. .. ."
Simultaneously with the issuance of the governor's proclamation,
General Short issued a proclamation in which he declared:
"I announce to the people of Hawaii, that, in compliance with
the above requests of the Governor of Hawaii, I have this day as-
sumed the position of military governor of Hawaii, and have taken
charge of the government of the territory ...
"I shall therefore shortly publish ordinances governing the con-
duct of the people of the Territory with respect to the showing of
lights, circulation, meetings, censorship, possession of arms, am-
9. 31 STAT. 153 (1900) ; 48 U.S.C. § 532 (1940).
10.' For the test of the governor's proclamation and the proclamation of General
Short taking over the government of Hawaii, see Ex parte White, 66 F. Supp. 92, 939,
990 (D. Haw. 1944).
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munition, and explosives and the sale of intoxicating liquors and
other subjects.
"In order to assist in repelling the threatened invasion of our is-
land home, good citizens will cheerfully obey this proclamation and
the ordinances to be published; others will be required to do so.
Offenders will be severely punished by military tribunals or will
be held in custody until such time as the civil courts are able to
function." 11
The text of the governor's proclamation was not communicated to
President Roosevelt 12 but the governor on December 7, 1941, sent the
following cable to the President:
"I have today declared martial law throughout the Territory of
Hawaii and have suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas cor-
pus. Your attention is called to Section 67 of the Hawaiian Organic
Act for your decision on my action." 11
President Roosevelt, on December 9, gave the governor his decision
as follows:
"Your telegram of December seventh received and your action
suspending the writ of habeas corpus and placing the Territory of
Hawaii under martial law in accordance with U. S. C. Title 48,
Section 532, has my approval." 14
Neither the governor's proclamation, in which he attempted to turn
over the powers of his office and the powers of judicial officers of the
territory to the commanding general, nor the commanding general's
proclamation, in which the general assumed the role of military gover-
nor of Hawaii, was ever submitted to the President. The governor had
advised the President that pursuant to the act of Congress he (the gov-
ernor) had, suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
placed the Territory of Hawaii under martial law. The President in his
reply approved the action of the governor. The governor did not advise
the President that he had turned over the duties of his office to the gen-
eral and obviously the President did not approve this action of which
he was completely in the dark.
General Short's proclamation indicates that it was his intention to
administer martial law along orthodox lines, i. e., that the "ordinances"
which he forecast would have some relevance to military necessity
to resist the "threatened invasion." Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H.
Greene 16 who was the executive officer under General Short, the self-
11. Ibid.
12. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 308 n. 2 (1946).
13. See Ex parte White, 66 F. Supp. 982, 989 (D. Haw. 1944).
14. Ibid. I I
15. Now Maj. Gen. Thomas H. Greene, Judge Advocate General, United States
Army.
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styled "military governor," evidently did not share this view. He
promptly set up a system for the administration of criminal law to pun-
ish civilians in provost courts presided over by army officers who meted
out penalties w ithout regard to the provisions of the statutes of the
territory or of the United States.
On the Monday following the attack the civil courts were suppressed
by order of General Short transmitted to the Chief Justice of the terri-
tory and army personnel moved in, took over the courtrooms, clerks'
offices, clerks and facilities of inferior courts throughout the territory.
A series of military orders was issued by General Short erecting a
complete military government over the Territory of Hawaii and vest-
ing in the so-called military governor complete power over the inhabi-
tants of Hawaii and their property. Orders were issued without regard
to the applicable provisions of territorial and federal law and Consti-
tution. The form of government of Hawaii was changed overnight, a
rigid censorship was imposed over the press, radio and mails. The gov-
ernment of the inhabitants of Hawaii took the form of "General Or-
ders" issued from the "Office of the Military Governor." In the tradi-
tional military practice the orders themselves were not signed by the
commanding general but by an executive to whom he had delegated
that function.
During the period December 30, 1941 to January 30, 1943, there were
issued 181 general orders covering the entire sweep of government
(except taxation), from the trial of civilians for felonies carrying the
death penalty down to the most trivial misdemeanors into minutiae
of the ordinary affairs of municipal government such as garbage col-
lection and the numbering of houses. As the Supreme Court said:
"Thus the military authorities took over the government of
Hawaii. They could and did, by simply promulgating orders, gov-
ern the day to day activities of civilians who lived, worked, or were
merely passing through there. The military tribunals interpreted
the very orders promulgated by the military authorities and pro-
ceeded to punish violators." 11
The population of Hawaii remained under this extreme military rule
until a modification was ordered-at the insistence of territorial offi-
cials-in proclamations of the governor 17 and the commanding general
which were issued on February 8, 1943, and became effective March 10,
1943.
Up to this point there had been no relaxation of military control ex-
16. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U. S. 304, 309 (1946).
17. Transcript of Record, p. 14, Duncan v. Kahanamoku, mipra note 16, hereinafter
cited as "Record"; see also Anthony, Martial Law, Military Go'vrnmnnt and the Writ
of Habeas Corptu, 31 CALIF. L. REv. 477, 508-11 (1943).
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cept to permit the civil courts to dispose of certain civil business which
military tribunals were unable to handle.
The proclamation of February 8, 1943, was the result of a compro-
mise to avoid taking the issue to the President who was then engaged
with plans for the African campaign. The compromise was presented
by the Secretary of War, the Attorney General and the Secretary of
the Interior in a letter to the President which stated:
"We are pleased to report that after lengthy discussions the De-
partments of War, Justice, and Interior have reached an operat-
ing agreement upon the distribution of governmental functions be-
tween the civil and military authorities in the Territory of Hawaii.
• ..Copies of the proclamations are enclosed for your information.
We also enclose a draft of a letter which we suggest you might ap-
propriately send to the Secretary of War. -18
The letter which had been prepared for the President's signature
acknowledged receipt of the proclamations to be issued by the com-
manding general and the governor of Hawaii and then stated:
"I wish to congratulate all departments concerned in their
cooperative and successful efforts to reach an amicable solution of
the knotty problems involved. . . .I can readily appreciate the
difficulty in defining exactly the boundaries between civil and mili-
tary functions. I think the formula which this proclamation ap-
plies meets the present needs." '"
It would seem obvious that the matter of defining the limits of mili-
tary and civil jurisdiction could hardly be the subject of negotiation
and compromise even though concurred in by the highest executive
officers of the nation. The legislative branch of our government alone
is the source of such powers and the executive is charged with carrying
out the mandate of the Congress. The executive is not charged with
rearranging the statutory scheme of government which Congress has
enacted for Hawaii.
This is not the place to appraise the motives that led the responsible
officials of the War Department to insist upon a continuance of a state
of martial law years after any rational justification for' its existence
had passed. This is the task of the historian or the psychologist of the
future. What we are here concerned with is an analysis of the action
of the courts in two concrete cases.
FACTS IN THE Duncan CASE
On February 24, 1944, Duncan, a civilian ship-fitter employed at
Pearl Harbor, reported to work. He engaged in a quarrel with two
18. Letter dated January 18, 1943, Record, p. 74.
19. Letter from the President to the Secretary of War dated February 1, 1943,
Record, p. 75, 76.
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armed marine sentries stationed at the gate. Duncan was arrested,
taken into custody and released the following morning. On March 2,
1944, he was brought before the provost court at Pearl Harbor pre-
sided over by a naval officer and there tried and convicted of the offense
of assault and battery against military personnel. He was sentenced
to imprisonment of six months in the Honolulu county jail.
On March 14, 1944, he petitioned the United States District Court
for the Territory of Hawaii for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that
his conviction and imprisonment were unlawful and unconstitutional,
that martial law did not lawfully exist in Hawaii and that regardless
of the existence of martial law, there was no military necessity for the
trial of civilians by a military tribunal. The return and answer admit-
ted that the duly constituted federal and territorial criminal courts
and civil courts were functioning; denied that petitioner's trial and
conviction were unlawful or unconstitutional; alleged that the proclam-
ation of the governor of February 8, 1943, continued a state of mar-
tial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;
alleged that Hawaii at all times since December 7, 1941, had been in
imminent danger of attack, and that the public safety required the
continuance of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ; and alleged finally that the provost courts were necessary "for
the successful prosecution of the war" and were established in good
faith and in the honest belief that military necessity required them.
Upon the hearing on the return to the order to show cause the peti-
tioner was released on bond pending a hearing on the merits. A full
record was made which amply demonstrated the absence of civil strife,
the functioning of territorial and federal courts and the lack of neces-
sity for military trials of civilians.
After examining the testimony of Admiral Nimitz and Lieutenant
General Richardson, the trial court found that they "agreed that an
invasion by enemy troops is now practically impossible" and that "no
part of the island of Oahu in the Territory of Hawaii is a battlefield to-
day nor has it been for over two years. . . ." With respect to the com-
promise reached by the cabinet officers the trial court said:
"Congress may give the Territory of Hawaii any form of govern-
ment it may see fit, conformable to Constitutional provisions, but
no one in the War Department has such lawful power." c
The court also found that the
"regularly constituted civil government was either in efficient op-
eration or fully capable of such operation in all of its branches and
ordinary departments and was sufficiently equipped, capable and
willing to perform all functions for which it was created." 21
20. Ex parte Duncan, 66 F. Supp. 976, 980 (D. Haw. 1944).
21. Id. at 981.
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As a result of these findings the trial court concluded that martial
law did not lawfully exist in Hawaii, that the office of military governor
was without lawful creation and that the provost court possessed no
lawful authority to try the petitioner; accordingly the court sustained
the writ and ordered the prisoner, discharged.
FACTS IN THE White CASE
Following the opinion of the district court in the Duncan case, a
petition was filed by one White, a civilian stockbroker who had been
tried, sentenced and convicted before a provost court on August 25,
1942, of the crime of embezzlement. White had been orally informed
of the charge against him, appeared in the provost court by counsel
who demanded trial by jury which was promptly denied and then de-
manded sufficient time to prepare his defense which was likewise denied.
The provost court sentenced him to five years' imprisonment. White
was discharged by the district court on May 2, 1944. 22
THE OPINIONS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
The Duncan and White cases were appealed jointly to the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which disposed of them en
banc 23 on November 1, 1944, with three opinions reversing the district
court. The opinion of the court by Circuit Judge Healy concluded
that the writ was availalkle to test the validity of the military trials,
that what was established in Hawaii was "nothing less than total
military government," that the presence' of a large Oriental popula-
tion "posed a continuous threat to public security," that "the summary
punishment of criminal offenders of every sort might conceivably serve
to discourage the commission of offenses immediately endangering the
general security," that at the time of the trial of White "the civil courts
were disabled from functioning" and that "the situation necessitated
his trial by the military."
In the Duncan case the circuit court of appeals had more difficulty,
It was confronted with a proclamation which substantially restored
civil authority. The court observed, however, that under the criminal
statutes of Hawaii the act of assaulting a military person was not the
subject of a specific crime punishable in the civil courts (which were
not authorized to enforce military orders). Reasoning from this pre-
mise, the court held:
22. Ex parte White, 66 F. Supp. 982 (D. Haw. 1944).
23. The court that heard the case consisted of Circuit Judges Wilbur, Garrecht, Den-
man, Matthews and Stephens; by oral stipulation it was agreed that Circuit Judge Healy
(who was absent) could participate. The opinion of the court was written by Hcaly, J.,
and concludes with the statement "Stephens, Circuit Judge, did not participate in the deci-
sion of these cases." Ex parte Duncan, 146 F.2d 576, 591 (C.C.A. 9th 1944).
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"... the power to punish infractions of military regulations of
this type must of necessity reside somewhere. If it has not by legis-
lation or municipal ordinance been delegated to the ordinary courts
or made subject to the authority of the civil police, the power must
perforce exist in the military arm of the government acting
through the medium of commissions or like tribunals." -4
It will be noted that this reasoning is circular. It proceeds upon the
assumption that military orders proscribing certain acts of civilians as
crimes are valid and since they are not made specifically enforceable
in the courts ordained by law they must of necessity be enforceable
somewhere and therefore are enforceable in military tribunals. This
assumes the issue involved, i.e., the validity of the orders. If the
military orders were valid that would be the end of the case. Ob-
viously, if one assumes them to be valid, a logical conclusion upholding
the trials presents no problem.
Circuit Judges Wilbur and Matthews evidently had some misgiving
as to the validity of the military trial of a civilian and preferred to state
an additional ground to support the reversal of the trial court, namely,
that the writ having been suspended by the President, it was not avail-
able to test the validity of the petitioner's trial and "%ithout a finding
of implied fraud on the part of the governor and the military authorities
the decision cannot be sustained." 25
The opinion of Judge Denman, who concurred in the reversal, placed
the case upon the ground that the petitions "show no facts invoking
the jurisdiction or power of the District Court to issue the writs." 2
It is somewhat difficult to understand this opinion since the petition
clearly alleged imprisonment after conviction by a tribunal whose juris-
diction was challenged both on statutory and constitutional grounds.
Apart from the fact that the courts have shown great liberality in the
technical aspects of petitions for writs of habeas corpus, the petitions
in these cases squarely challenged the validity of the restraint of the
prisoners. 27
The disposition by the circuit court of appeals of Ex parte Spur-
lock, 2s a companion to the Duwaln and White cases, sheds light on the
basis of the court's opinion in the latter cases. Spurlock, a civilian,
was charged in the magistrate's court of Honolulu with assaulting a
24. Id. at 584. The argument that there was a void in the federal and territorial law
making assault and battery a crime because it punished the wrongful act generally but did
not make assault and battery against military personnel a specific crime, is reminiscent of
the remark attributed to Judge Bean who is said to have ruled that he could find nothing
in the criminal code of Texas that made the killing of a Chinaman murder.
25. Id. at 589.
26. Id. at 590.
27. Cf. Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U. S. 342, 350 (1941).
28. 66 F. Supp. 997 (D. Hawo. 1944), rcz'd per curiamt en banc sub nom. Steer v.
Spurlock, 146 F2d 652, (C.C.A. 9th 1944).
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police officer and was released on bond in November 1941. His case
was not called up for disposition until after the outbreak of war. In
January 1942, he was summoned by the provost court on the charge
previously made against him in the magistrate's court. In the interim
the military courts had ousted the civil courts of jurisdiction. He en-
tered a plea of not guilty, was promptly found guilty, sentenced to five
years' imprisonment, begged for clemency and was placed on proba-
tion. Thereafter he reported to the territorial probation officer as di-
rected. In March 1942, Spurlock was involved in a fight with another
civilian in Honolulu, taken into custody by the military police, held
for four days without bond and then brought before the provost court.
When his case came before the provost judge he was asked whether he
was on probation; having replied in the affirmative be was promptly
sentenced to five years of hard labor.
At the hearing on Spurlock's petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
the clerk of the provost court testified as to the procedural history of
the case, there being nothing in the record to indicate whether Spurlock
had entered a plea or was given any trial at all. The district court
found "that Spurlock did not plead guilty to the March 28 charge, but
was, without trial, found guilty and disposed of accordingly . . " 29
The district court pointed out that even a person subject to military
trial is entitled to due process and that Spurlock, having been convicted
and imprisoned without trial, was denied his constitutional rights under
the Fifth Amendment. The action of the circuit court of appeals in
reversing the judgment of the district court in the Spirlock case per
curiam is significant in probing the basis of the judgment of the appel-
late court in the Duncan and White cases. The opinion of reversal in
the Spurlock case holds that during time of war, when the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended, a civilian may be charged
in a military tribunal, found guilty without trial, and sentenced to im-
prisonment, and that the action of the military authorities is not sub-
ject to judicial inquiry.
Spurlock petitioned for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court on
January 13, 1945. The Department of Justice, evidently not desiring
to attempt to sustain the decision of the circuit court of appeals, on
February 15, 1945, filed a "suggestion that the cause has become moot,"
the suggestion being based upon a pardon filed by Lieutenant General
Robert C. Richardson, Jr., reciting that
". .. it appears to the best interest of the United States that the
execution of so much of the sentence of the said Frederick L. Spur-
lock as remains unexecuted on this 3 February 1945 be remitted so
that he may engage in work that will promote the national defense
of the United -States." "
29. Ex parte Spurlock, 66 F. Supp. 997, 1001 (D. Haw. 1944).
30. Id. at 1006; under § 66 of the Hawaiian Organic Act, 31 STAT. 153 (1900), as
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Spurlock had been imprisoned by the military government of Hawaii
from March 28, 1942 to February 3, 1945, without trial upon the charge
of having committed a misdemeanor.
The record of the Department of Justice in mooting cases involving
martial law in Hawaii to prevent a determination of the issue in the
Supreme Court is impressive. In Zimmerman v. Walker the petition
for certiorari was filed on March 13, 1943; promptly thereafter the
Solicitor General filed a memorandum which recited that the case had
become moot by reason of the release of the petitioner on or about
March 12, 1943. 31 The War Department would have been better ad-
vised to have pressed for a prompt decision in the Supreme Court in
the Zimmerman case in early 1942. The strategic advantage of such
a course seemed clearly indicated for two reasons: (1) the war had not
progressed to a point where victory was in sight and (2) the particular
case involved internment for military security and not the validity
of a military trial. Although there is little to choose between being
imprisoned without a trial and being imprisoned after a trial by a court
that has no jurisdiction (except for the stigma that exists in the former
case) it is far easier to find a legal justification in the former case than
it is in the latter.
THE OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Certiorari was granted in the Duncan and White cases and they
were argued in the Supreme Court on December 7, 1945, four years
after Pearl Harbor. In the meantime the President by proclamation
effective October 24, 1944, had formally terminated the state of martial
law and restored the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. 32
Restoration of the privilege of the writ by presidential proclamation
prompted the Government in the Supreme Court to recede from its
position denying the jurisdiction of the district court to entertain the
petitions for writs of habeas corpus. "1 With the issues thus narrowed
amended, 48 U.S.C. § 531 (1940) the pardoning power is in the governor and the Presi-
dent; assuming the invalidity of the trial the commanding general's exercise of the par-
doning power presented no problem.
31. Zimmerman v. Walker, 132 F.2d 442 (C.C.A. 9th 1942), ccrt. dcnied "on the ground
that the cause is moot, it appearing that Hans Zimmerman, on whose behalf the petition is
filed, has been released from respondent's custody," 319 U.S. 744 (1943). Ex parte Glock-
ner, (D. Haw. 1943, No. 295), (dismissed by the district court as moot by reason of the
removal of prisoner and his release in California). Ex pare Seifert, (D. Haw. 1943, No.
296), (dismissed by the district court as moot by reason of the removal of prisoner and
his release in California). Steer v. Spurlock, 146 F.2d 652 (C.C.A. 9th 1944), cert. denfetd
"on the ground that the cause is moot," 324 U.S. 863 (1945).
32. Proclamation 2627, 9 Fmo. REG. 12831 (1944).
33. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 312 (1946). The Supreme Court did not
pass on the issue whether the suspension was a general one or limited to cases which the
public safety required. Petitioner took the position that the suspension both under the
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the convictions in the provost court were challenged upon three
grounds: (1) that Section 67 of the Hawaiian Organic Act did not au-
thorize the trial of civilians before military tribunals; (2) that if Section
67 authorized the trial of civilians before military tribunals it was un-
constitutional; and (3) that if Section 67 was constitutional and author-
ized the trial of civilians before military tribunals, the factual situation
existing on March 14, 1944, did not warrant this extreme application of
martial law.
Four opinions were delivered, Justice Black writing for the Court,
Chief Justice Stone and Justice Murphy writing concurring opinions
and Justice Burton writing a dissent in which Justice Frankfurter
joined. Justice Black did not find it necessary to pass upon the con-
stitutional issue involved since the first question, namely, whether the
Organic Act authorized the trial and punishment of civilians by the
military, was decisive. In examining Section 67 of the Organic Act,
Justice Black stated first that Congress did not attempt a definition
of the term "martial law" and that the Constitution makes no refer-
ence to it from which he concluded:
"The language of Section 67 thus fails to define adequately the
scope of the power given to the military and to show whether the
Organic Act provides that courts of law be supplanted by military
tribunals." 34
This conclusion discounts the fact that prior judicial decisions had
given content to the term "martial law."
Justice Black next considered the argument that the language of
Constitution and Section 67 of the Organic Act was limited to the class of persons hostile
to the government and that the writ was available in all other cases-e.g., abduction or
any other unlawful detention including detention as a result of conviction by a tribunal
that had no jurisdiction. Historically the suspension of the privilege of the writ was con-
fined to enemies of the state. This is clear from the legislative suspensions in England,
see 18 GEo. III, c. 1, (1778) ; and although it is not clearly recorded in the debates, there
can be little doubt that the framers of the Constitution had the precedents of 1British
legislative suspensions in mind 'when Art. I, § 9, cl. 2 was adopted, see 2 FAR.AND,
RacoRDs OF THE Fa-DERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 438 (1911), 3 id. at 149; Hun,
A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY AND THE WRIT OF HAEAS Copus 116
(2d ed. 1876). The Civil War suspensions by President Lincoln were likewise limited;
see Proclamation of May 10, 1861 (authorizing the military commander in Florida to
suspend the writ "and to remove ... dangerous or suspected persons"), 6 RICHARDSON,
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESID.NTS 16 (1898); Proclamation of September 24,
1862, 13 STAT. 730 (1862) (authorizing the detention of persons "guilty of any disloyal
practice") ; Proclamation No. 7 of September 15, 1863, 13 STAT. 734 (1863) (after statu-
tory sanction of the suspension, authorizing the detention of certain persons as "aiders or
abetters of the enemy"). Horace Binney, an advocate of executive suspension during the
Civil War, held the view that the Constitution permitted only a limited suspension as to
persons hostile to the government, see BiNNEY, THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CoRPus UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 19 (2d ed. 1862).
34.- 327 U.S. 304, 315-6 (1946).
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Section 67 was imported from the Constitution of the Republic of
Hawaii and that in In re Kalanianaole 11 the Supreme Court of Hawaii
had construed Article 31 of the Constitution of the Republic to author-
ize the trial of civilians before military tribunals. Justice Black pointed
out in passing that the defendants there involved,
". .. were insurrectionists taking part in the very uprising which
the military were to suppress, while here the petitioners had no con-
nection with any organized resistance to the armed forces or the
established government." 3G
Not, however, content with this distinction, Justice Black proceeded,
on behalf of the Court, to reject the contention that the Kalanianaole
decision was any guide whatsoever to the meaning of Section 67 of the
Organic Act:
". .. we are certain that Congress did not wish to make that case
part of the Organic Act. For that case did not merely uphold mili-
tary trials of civilians but also held that courts were to interfere only
when there was an obvious abuse of discretion which resulted in
cruel and inhuman practices or the establishment of military rule
for the personal gain of the President and the armed forces. But
courts were not to review whether the President's action, no matter
how unjustifiable, was necessary for the public safety." 3-
The conclusion that the term "martial law" as used by Congress in
Section 67 of the Hawaiian Organic Act is virtually meaningless is not
too persuasive historically. Section 67 of the Organic Act was taken
verbatim from Article 31 of the Constitution of the Republic. The
Organic Act was adopted in 1900. Five years prior to its adoption the
Supreme Court of the Republic of Hamaii had decided the Kalanianaolc
case which held that a military commission was authorized by Article
31 of the Constitution of the Republic. Chief Justice Frear who was
the author of the opinion was also one of the annexation commissioners
who appeared before Congress on the adoption of the Hawaiian Or-
ganic Act. It would seem reasonable to suppose that Chief Justice
Frear understood Section 67 to mean what he had read the same words
as meaning for the Supreme Court of the Republic five years before.
The important distinction, however, between the Kalanianaole case
and Duncan v. Kahanawoku is that the accused in the former case was
engaged in aiding the insurrection, while the accused in Duncan v.
Kahanamoku was not opposed to the government. Moreover at the
time of the trial of the Kalanianaole case, the civil courts were open
35. 10 Haw. 29 (1895).
36. 327 U.S. 304, 316 (1946).
37. Id. at 317.
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and exercising their statutory criminal and civil jurisdiction. 1s In no
instance during the state of martial law did military tribunals assert
any jurisdiction except as to those who were charged with disloyal
practices. There is one further point of difference: namely, in the IKa-
lanianaole case, Article 31 of the Constitution was supplemented by
legislative acts which authorized the trial of disloyal persons before
military commissions and although this was not mentioned in the opin-
ion of the court in In re Kalanianaole, it is nonetheless significant. "'
In the face of this history it would seem that the term "martial law"
was intended to permit the trial by a military commission of civilians
charged with disloyal practices-to which category the petitioners Dun-
can and White did not belong.
This poses two constitutional issues: assuming Section 67 intended
to permit military trials of civilians (1) is the section valid on its face?
and (2) if it is valid, are the particular military trials in question ones
required by the public safety and hence unassailable? The opinion of
the Court does not reach the constitutional issues since the Court found
that the words of the statute do not include such trials. While as a
matter of the legal history of Hawaii this interpretation of the section
may be questionable, it should be remembered that the Constitution
of the Republic of Hawaii did not contain the crisp language of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments guaranteeing the rights of due process,
indictment by a grand jury and trial by a jury. At the time Article 31
was drafted and when In re Kalanianaole was decided the Constitu-
tion of the Republic did not unequivocally guarantee a trial by jury. 40
The Government in the Duncan case argued that Section 5 of the
Organic Act, in which Congress provided "that the Constitution . . .
shall have the same force and effect within the said Territory as else-
where in the United States," '41 extended the Constitution only to a
limited extent and specifically as circumscribed by Section 67 and the
judicial construction placed thereon by the Kalanianaole case. This
tenuous view had earlier been put forth in support of the military regime
in Hawaii in an article which confessed that a similar course would be
unconstitutional within the continental limits of the United States. 42
Never since the annexation had the application of the Federal Consti-
38. This was specifically provided in the Proclamation of President Dole of Jan-
uary 7, 1895; see In re Kalanianaole, 10 Haw. 29, 45 (1895).
39. See Acts of the Republic of Hawaii, 1895: Act 18 of February 8, 1895, authorizing
the execution of sentences of military commissions; Acts 20 and 24 of March 15, 1895,
ratifying and granting immunity.
40. CoNsnTuTioN OF THE REPUBLIC OF HAWAII (1894), Art. 6, § 1. "No person
shall be subject to punishment for any offense except on due and legal conviction thereof
by a tribunal having jurisdiction of the case."
41. 31 STAT. 141 (1900); 48 U.S.C. § 495 (1940).
42. King, The Legality of Martial Law in Hawaii, 30 CALIF. L. REY. 599, 632 (1942).
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tution to Hawaii been seriously challenged. In fact, an unbroken line 43
of decisions had indicated that the Constitution (and specifically the
Bill of Rights) protects the rights of residents in the territory to the same
extent that it protects those of residents in the several states. The
opinion of Justice Black puts that issue at rest:
"It follows that civilians in Hawaii are entitled to the constitu-
tional guarantee of a fair trial to the same extent as those who live
in any other part of our country.. .. For here Congress did not
in the Organic Act exercise whatever power it might have had to
limit the application of the constitution. Cf. Iawaii v. Manhid,
190 U. S. 197. The people of Hawaii are therefore entitled to con-
stitutional protection to the same extent as the inhabitants of the
48 states." 44
It should be noted that the opinion of the Court leaves open the ques-
tion as to the power of Congress to limit the application of the Consti-
tution to an organized territory. Although that issue was not necessary
to a decision it has generally been believed that the extension of the
Federal Constitution to an organized territory is irrevocable. 45
Since the Organic Act, according to the Court's opinion, gives no
clue to the scope and meaning of "martial law," Justice Black found it
necessary to turn to the history of our institutions to interpret the ex-
pression, pointing out the profound distrust which Anglo-American
peoples have traditionally had of the exercise of military power. Quot-
ing with approval the Court's historic admonition in Dow v. Johnson, 41
that "the military should always be kept in subjection to the laws of
the country to which it belongs, and .. .he is no friend to the Repub-
lic who advocates the contrary," Justice Black concluded that Section
67 afforded no authority for the petitioners' detention:
"We believe that when Congress passed the Hawaiian Organic
Act and authorized the establishment of 'martial law' it had in mind
and did not wish to exceed the boundaries between military and
civilian power, in which our people have always believed, which re-
sponsible military and executive officers had heeded, and which had
become part of our political philosophy and institutions prior to the
time Congress passed the Organic Act. The phrase 'martial law'
as employed in that Act, therefore, while intended to authorize the
military to act vigorously for the defense of the Islands against ac-
43. Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S.
197 (1903) ; c. Inter-Island Co. v. Hawaii, 305 U.S. 306 (1938); Dorr v. United States,
195 U.S. 138 (1904); Binns v. United States, 194 U.S. 486 (1904); Mormon Church v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890). For the status of an unincorporated territory, sce
Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 293 (1922).
44. 327 U.S. 304, 318-9 (1946).
45. Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 44 (1885).
46. 100 U.S. 158, 169 (1879).
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tual or threatened rebellion or invasion, was not intended to author-
ize the supplanting of courts by military tribunals." 47
It has been noted that, according to the Court, Section 67 of the
Hawaiian Organic Act gives no clue to the meaning of "martial law".
Justice Black's opinion says that the language "fails to define ade-
quately the scope of the power given to the military and to show
whether the Organic Act provides that courts of law be supplanted
by military tribunals." 48
The expression "martial law," however indefinite it was in 1857 when
Caleb Cushing wrote his opinion 11 on the subject, had gathered form
through the passage of years. Text writers and the courts had reached
the conclusion that martial law is nothing more than the exercise of
executive power which is necessary to cope with a given emergency.
Thus it had been held in Moyer v. Peabody that during times of strife
after a declaration of martial law it is competent for the executive to
detain persons connected with the current strife and such detention
during the period of the exigency is not a denial of due process of law. 11
The Court in that case had before it the narrow issue whether the tem-
porary restraint during the existence of martial law was justified. The
Supreme Court held that it was. Some, however, have been misled by
the rhetoric of Justice Holmes into the mistaken view that the case
stands for the proposition that under any circumstances "a decision
by the head of the state upon a matter involving its life" is final and
not reviewable by the courts.
Reflection upon this proposition reveals its invalidity in a system
of government based on the separation of powers. If we reach the con-
clusion that in a given circumstance the acts of the executive branch
are not reviewable in the courts, then it follows that the executive
branch is supreme over either the legislative or judicial branches of
government. To be specific, if the executive by an appropriate finding
says that in a particular circumstance the life of the state is at stake,
then, irrespective of the existence of legislation or the availability of
judicial review, the acts of the executive are final. Thus the historic
doctrine of the separation of powers is completely nullified.
Fortunately for the law of the subject, the generality of the language
used by Justice Holmes has been limited in an opinion by an unani-
47. 327 U.S. 304, 3Z4 (1946).
48. Id. at 316.
49. 8 Ops. AreY GEN. 365 (1857).
50. 212 U.S. 78 (1909). Dictum in the opinion of the Court written by Justice
Holmes is frequently cited for more than the proposition which the case actually holds.
Justice Holmes said: "When it comes to a decision by the head of the state upon a
matter involving its life, the ordinary rights of individuals must yield to what lie deems
the necessities of the moment." Id. at 85.
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mous Court involving the declaration of martial law by the governor
of Texas. The Supreme Court, in reviewing the action of the executive
and specifically the proposition urged upon it that the acts of the exec-
utive were not reviewable in the courts, said:
"If this extreme position could be deemed to be well taken, it is
manifest that the fiat of a state governor, and not the Constitution
of the United States, would be the supreme law of the land ... " -1
The Court also said:
"There is no such avenue of escape from the paramount authority
of the Federal Constitution. . ....
"What are the allowable limits of military discretion, and
whether or not they have been overstepped in a particular case,
are judicial questions." 12
It should be noted that the Court in reaching the conclusion in the
case just referred to found an "appropriate answer in . . . Ex pare
Milligan . . .. 19 -3 In other words, the exercise of martial law powers
by a state governor in time of domestic disturbance within the state
is to be measured by the same standard applicable to the exercise of
martial law powers by the military authorities in time of civil war.
It has been suggested that the powers exercised by the nation in time
of a war of survival are different in kind from those required in time
of civil strife falling short of a national or civil war. At first blush this
has a ring of validity. No one will dispute the proposition that our
Government should not and must not be curtailed in the prosecution
of war. The Constitution gives the Government through its legisla-
tive and executive branches the power to wage war and, as Chief Jus-
tice Hughes.once said, "the power to wage war is the power to wage war
successfully." 14
The difficulty with the apologists for the exercise of military power
is that the rule which they advocate means that the executive, in times
of great exigency, may do anything which he in his unreviewable deter-
mination concludes is necessary or proper for the advancement of the
military program. This view is really not as desirable from the mili-
tary standpoint as it might appear even wholly apart from its un-
constitutionality. The executive alone cannot raise armies or levy
taxes, or at least he cannot perform these tasks effectively and com-
prehensively unless we are prepared for a complete surrender to a to-
51. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378, 397 (1932).
52. Id. at 398, 401.
53. Id. at 402.
54. Hughes, War Powers under the Consttution, SEN. Dcc. No. 105, 65th Cong., 1st
Sess. 7 (1917); 47 A.B.A. REP. 232, 238 (1917).
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talitarian state. Under our frame of government the power to wage
war is vested jointly in the executive and the legislative branches. "
Obviously neither the executive nor the legislative branch may wage
var successfully alone; the joint action of both is essential in order
that the full force of our power may be exerted. There is no reason to
assume that the Congress would be less desirous of victory than the
executive nor to suppose that it would withhold any needed power
from the executive. The role of the judiciary in time of war is essen-
tially no different than it is in time of peace since our system is designed
to function in war and in peace under the same pattern. This does not
mean, however, that the exertion of either executive or legislative power
which might be doubtful in time of peace would not be upheld in time
of war. 11
In time of war there is a wide difference between the exercise of exec-
utive power pursuant to an act of Congress and the unilateral action
of the executive. At the outset of World War II, Congress and the
executive by joint action concluded that the safety of the nation re-
quired the removal of persons of Japanese ancestry from the west coast.
In Korematsu v. United States, this exercise of the war powers was af-
firmed by a divided Court. 11
Although the Korematsu decision has been sharply criticized, 68 ir-
respective of one's views on the results reached by the Court it must
be remembered that the Court was confronted with a fait accompli
and that an adverse decision would have meant endless complications
in the midst of war. The fact that an opposite result would have posed
an extremely difficult domestic problem at the time when a united
effort was most needed is not too solid a basis for a constitutional de-
cision but it is not without precedent in our constitutional history. 9
It must be remembered that the Supreme Court is only one of the
branches of government and that the power it exerts is largely nega-
tive. It is not an instrument for either the initiation or administration
of governmental programs in war or in peace.
THE CONCURRING OPINION OF JUSTICE MURPHY
Justice Murphy concurred in the opinion of the Court in the Dun-
can case holding that military trials were not authorized under Section
'67 of the Organic Act, but he felt obliged to state separately his rea-
55. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942).
56. Bloch v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921) (upholding rent-control in the District of
Columbia in World War I) ; Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U.S. 146 (1919)
(upholding wartime prohibition by legislative action in World War I).
57. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
58. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-a Disaster, 54 YALE L. 3. 489 (1945).
59. Cf. Norman v. B. & 0. R. R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935) ; Perry v. United States, 294
U.S. 330 (1935).
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sons why "the usurpation of civil power by the military is so great in
this instance as to warrant this Court's complete and outright repudi-
ation of the action." 60
While it might be thought that Justice Murphy's concurring opinion
is not in keeping with the judicial tradition against passing upon more
than what is necessary to the disposition of a particular case, neverthe-
less in the light of the Government's argument and the inadequacies
of the dissenting opinion the reasons for Justice Murphy's separate
concurrence become apparent. 1 He examined the Government's argu-
ments seriatim.
First: The notion that a state of martial law is an "all or nothing"
concept and that anything that is done after a declaration is not re-
viewable in the courts is palpably untenable. Because Hawaii, subse-
quent to the original raid of December 7, may have been subject to the
threat of subsequent raids, is certainly no reason for upholding mili-
tary orders not required by the public safety which were issued several
years later. Granting the existence of the danger of a subsequent at-
tack Justice Murphy said:
"But it does not follow from these assumptions that the military
was free under the Constitution to close the civil courts or to strip
them of their criminal jurisdiction, especially after the initial shock
of the sudden Japanese attack had been dissipated." 2
Second: The argument that the civil courts were not swmift enough
to meet the needs of the commanding general who could not brook a
delay 6 3 is hardly a justification for scrapping the Bill of Rights. This
becomes clear once it is conceded that what the public safety requires
and not what a particular general desires is the standard.
Third: The argument that the military commander should have a
tribunal at his disposal to enforce his orders is simply an argument for
dictatorship:
"Moreover, the mere fact that it may be more expedient and
convenient for the military to try violators of its own orders before
its own tribunals does not and should not afford a constitutional
basis for the jurisdiction of such tribunals when civil courts are in
fact functioning or are capable of functioning." 64
Fourth: Obviously untenable is the argument that the military area
60. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 325 (1946).
61. The opinion of the Court, like the separate opinion of Justice Murphy, goes be-
yond the minimum holding necessary for the disposition of the case. Thus the situation
presented in Ex pare Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (U.S. 1866), was repeated for the same reasons.
62. 327 U.S. 304, 330 (1946).
63. Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr., admitted on cross-e.mamination that he had
no basis for his testimony as to delays in the courts of Hawaii. Record, p. 1051.
64. 327 U.S. 304, 332 (1946).
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statute, 65 which vested in the military arm broad powers to promulgate
regulations in designated areas but required their enforcement in the
federal courts, was inadequate because the regulations were enforceable
only in federal courts:
"That the military refrained from using the statutory framework
which Congress erected affords no constitutional justification for
the creation of military tribunals to try such violators." 6
It is for the Congress to decide this issue, not the executive.
Fifth: Another argument in support of military trials was advanced
by the Government on the basis of the testimony of General Richardson
to whom the civil courts were obnoxious because as he testified they
were subject to "all sorts of influences, political and otherwise." The
natural preference of a military commander for tribunals which will do
precisely what he commands is hardly equivalent to a finding that
military trials are essential to the public safety. In fact such a prefer-
ence does not even meet the test of reasonable judgment laid down in
Hirabayashi v. United States 67 where the Court was passing on formal
legislative action-not military fiat standing alone. "This, "according
to Justice Murphy, "is merely a military criticism of the proposition
that in this nation the military is subordinate to the civil authority.
It does not qualify as a recognizable reason for closing the civil courts
to criminal cases." 6s
Sixth: The feeble argument that attendance at jury trials would in-
terrupt war work was readily disposed of by the observation that war
workers could be excused from jury service. 60 This was the very thing
that the senior circuit judge in Honolulu had proposed to the military
authorities immediately after the outbreak of war.
Seventh: The last reason advanced by the Government in support
of military trials was the character of the population of Hawaii and
the presence of those of Japanese ancestry. This red herring was in-
jected into the case by the return and answer of the Government. 70
65. 56 STAT. 173 (1942), 18 U.S. § 97(a) (Supp. 1946).
66. 327 U.S. 304, 332 (1946).
67. 320 U.S. 81, 95 (1943).
68. 327 U.S. 304, 332 (1946).
69. Judge A. M. Cristy testified: "... on the morning after the so-called blitz, the
Judges assembled.... Shortly after that, and during that week or the following week,
several conferences were had with officers delegated from the Military Governor's office
as to the contribution that the Judges of the Court could make toward assisting, and any-
thing that would be necessary in curtailing their activity for a time being until things
were settled down. . . . And suggestions were made as to how the Judges could conduct
their business, both as to continuances and as to setting of cases so as to make the least
disturbance or necessity for popular gathering around the Courthouse but carry on
the business of the Court. But we got nowhere for quite awhile." Record, p. 600-1.
70. The Government's return and answer in the Duncan case cover 356 pages in the
printed record. Record, pp. 25-381.
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How this could be advanced seriously in the light of the conduct of the
inhabitants of Hawaii and specifically that of the Americans of Japa-
nese ancestry is difficult to understand, 71 except on the theory that
it might strike a responsive chord on the bench. 7 2 The record in the
Duncan case contains a complete demonstration of the loyalty of all
elements of the Hawaiian population. No contention was advanced
that the Hawaiians of Japanese ancestry were anything but law-abid-
ing, loyal citizens; the Government's theory evidently was, however,
that they might be otherwise, and that therefore the military should
have military tribunals to administer criminal punishment to the en-
tire community. As stated by Colonel Kendall J. Fielder, in charge of
military intelligence in Hawaii during the period, no act of sabotage
or espionage was known to have been committed by persons of Japa-
nese descent in Hawaii either on or subsequent to December 7, 1941. 7
THE CONCURRING OPINION OF CHIEF JUSTICE STONE
The concurring opinion of the late Chief Justice Stone follows the
dogma of the Court in deciding a case on the narrowest issue necessary
for its disposition. 74 Had there been but one opinion in the case, his
would have adequately disposed of the litigation with a minimum of
rhetoric. The late Chief Justice did not agree that the term "martial
law" as used in Section 67 of the Hawaiian Organic Act is "devoid of
meaning." 75 His succinct definition of "martial law" is a distillation of
the previous decisions of the Court on the subject:
"It is a law of necessity to be prescribed and administered by the
executive power. Its object, the preservation of the public safety
and good order, defines its scope, which will vary with the circum-
stances and the necessities of the case. The exercise of the power
may not extend beyond what is required by the exigency which calls
it forth." 76
71. See LIND, HAWAII'S JAPANESE, AN EXPEMI MNT ix DEMOCMRCY (1946).
72. No member of the Court accepted this argument which had no basis in the rec-
ord; but see the opinion of the circuit court of appeals, 146 F.2d 576, 580 (C.C.A. 9th
1944).
73. Record, p. 687. Admiral Chester V. Nimitz, testifying before the House Com-
mittee on Public Lands, said: "Before World War II, I entertained some doubt as to
the loyalty of the American citizens of Japanese ancestry in the event of war with
Japan. From my observation during World War II, I no longer have that doubt." Hcar-
ings before Committee on Public Lands on H. R. 49, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1947), and
see the unanimous report of the Committee reporting favorably on H.R. 49 (Hawaii
Statehood Bill), H.R. REP. No. 194, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
74. Adherence to judicial self restraint is a characteristic of the late Chief Justice's
opinions. See his dissent in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 79 (1936).
75. 327 U.S. 304, 335 (1946).
76. Ibid.
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The Chief Justice conceded broad discretion in the determination
of the necessity of martial law and its exercise,
"But executive action is not proof'of its own necessity, and the
military's judgment here is not conclusive that every action taken
pursuant to the declaration of martial law was justified by the
exigency." 1
This terse statement is an acute coinment on the Government's posi-
tion, namely, that whenever an order was issued by a military com-
mander the fact of the issuance of the order alone was proof of its neces-
sity and that judges who thought otherwise were invading the hallowed
ground of military strategy. If this extreme view of executive power
were to be accepted by the courts it would be an end of liberty under
the law. Whether the public safety demands the suppression of the
civil courts is not a question on which the military have any superior
degree of expert knowledge.
Willing to assume that the Constitution permits the substitution of
trials by military tribunals for trials in civil courts if the public safety
requires it, Chief Justice Stone then observed that the invasion of De-
cember 7 had ended long prior to the military trials in question. Fur-
thermore, the fact that places of amusements were opened on December
24, 1941, and that bars were opened on February 4, 1942, was cogent
evidence that the public safety did not require the closing of the courts,
for "trials of petitioners in the civil courts no more endangered the
public safety than the gathering of the population in saloons and places
of amusement, which was authorized by military order." 78 Thus, in
the Chief Justice's words,
"The military authorities themselves testified and advanced no
reason which has any bearing on public safety or good order for
closing the civil courts to the trial of these petitioners, or for trying
them in military courts. I can only conclude that the trials and
convictions upon which petitioners are now detained, were unau-
thorized by the statute, and without lawful authority." 71
THE DISSENTING OPINION OF JUSTICE BURTON
Justice Burton in his dissenting opinion took occasion to announce
his faith in the Bill of Rights and thereafter apparently conceded
(counter to the main argument of the Government) that the Federal
Constitution applies in Hawaii in full force and effect as elsewhere in
the United States. The dissent, in which Justice Frankfurter concurred,
then proceeds with a detailed examination of the military situation not
77. 327 U.S. 304, 336 (1946).
78. Id. at 337.
79. Ibid.
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only in Hawaii but in the Central Pacific, Southwest Pacific and Euro-
pean theaters. This analysis bears little or no relation to what the pub-
lic safety in Hawaii required which, as the Chief Justice pointed out,
is the key to any judgment on executive action after the declaration of
martial law.
Simply because there has been a declaration of martial law does not
mean that all acts subsequent thereto are required by the public safety.
What is in fact required is a judicial question and is reviewable in the
courts. Justice Burton quite properly observed that in the field of mili-
tary action in time of war the executive has wide discretion and that
"it seems clear that at least on an active battlefield, the executive dis-
cretion to determine policy is there intended by the Constitution to be
supreme." 80
He then posed the question, "What is a battlefield and how long does
it remain one after the first barrage?" 8' To answer this question he
first observed that courts have power to review "the outer limits" of
the jurisdiction of the military authorities but that this requires a court
to put itself in the position of the executive; that to recreate the emer-
gency is impossible and the court should be reluctant to judge military
action "too closely by the inapplicable standards of judicial or even mili-
tary hindsight." What the Justice does not seem to have realized is that
there is a difference between such acts of a military commander as tak-
ing possession of a building or a beach or requiring certain fortifications
to be built or even interning suspicious characters and the creation by
the military commander of a system of military tribunals for the trial
of civilians. In the one category the acts of the military commander
for all practical purposes are conclusive.
The reason the courts will not review or, to speak more accurately,
are reluctant to review the actual exertion of force by a military com-
mander after a declaration of martial law, is precisely what Justice
Burton had in mind when he talked about the difficulty of recreating
the emergency and judging action by judicial or military hindsight, for
in such instances the commander acts in extremis. He may be right or
he may be wrong but under no other method could warfare be con-
ducted. Therefore his judgment is conclusive. The trial and punish-
ment of persons charged with crime, however, takes place under no
such stress. Even a military tribunal presumably undertakes a delib-
erative 82 process with an avowed effort on the part of the provost court
to give the accused due process and mete out justice. It is not some-
80. Id. at 342.
81. Ibid.
82. The picture of meting out rough and swift justice "amidst great social disorder"
discussed by BmmEuwpna, MILiTARY GOVERNIENT AND MARTIAL LAN, 492 (1892), has
no factual resemblance to Hawaii after December 7, 1941.
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thing that has to be done on the spur of the moment lest the fate of the
nation be imperiled; hence such trials in the instant case were not re-
quired by the public safety.
The standard to be applied is far different in this field (military trials
of civilians) from the standard to be applied in judging the exertion of
force. The dissent is wholly unrealistic in concluding that, because
Pearl Harbor was under attack for several hours on December 7, 1941,
and in that sense could be considered a battlefield, it therefore was a
battlefield in March, 1944, when our forces were knocking at the inner
ring of the Japanese defenses.
The dissent is inaccurate in stating the President "supported" the
action of the governor in turning over his functions and those of judi-
cial officers to the commanding general. After quoting the proclama-
tion of the governor turning over the government to the commanding
general the opinion states: "This action was communicated by him to the
President ... ." 83 That action was never communicated by the gov-
ernor to the President and hence the President never passed on the
question whether the governor should or was authorized to turn over
his statutory powers and those of judicial officers to the commanding
general.
Beyond this inaccuracy, however, there is a deeper defect, namely,
that neither Section 67 nor any other statute authorizes such a delega-
tion of power. In other words, assuming a valid declaration of martial
law, there is no escaping from the conclusion that the act of Congress
contemplates that the governor and not a general or an admiral or any-
one else should be the administrator of the martial law proclaimed.
It is of interest to note that the theory of the Government's defense,
namely that the powers of the military were derivative from the gover-
nor, was an innovation of the Department of Justice; it was not the
operating theory of the army in Hawaii. The army's position was that
after the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege
of the writ the power of the military was supreme in all branches of the
Hawaiian government. The "supersession" as it has been called was
complete including the governor himself as well as the courts, the Legis-
lature of Hawaii and the Congress." Thus, when restoration took place
by proclamation on February 8, 1943, two proclamations were issued,
one by the governor which had legal standing and effect under Section
67 of the Organic Act and. the other by the commanding general in
which he announced:
"1. Full jurisdiction and authority are hereby relinquished by
the Commanding General to the Governor and bther officers of the
Territory of Hawaii, to the courts of that territory, to the city and
county of Honolulu, to other counties, to all other officers of the
83. 327 U.S. 304, 347 (1946).
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territory or other persons acting under its authority, to the United
States District Court for Hawaii, and to the appropriate officers of
the United States, to exercise such powers as may now or hereafter
be vested in them respectively by law over the following matters
and others necessarily related thereto." 84
The proclamation of the commanding general purporting to give back
powers that he never held was without statutory basis but is significant
to demonstrate the military view of its supremacy to the civil power.
Justice Burton seems to have been of the view that the military pro-
ceeded to relax controls as and when the exigencies of the situation per-
mitted. This is unsupported by the record -which discloses that the
original restoration by the proclamation of February 8, 1943 (effective
March 10, 1943) was accomplished only after protracted negotiations
in Washington and that thereafter not a single step was taken to relax
the controls despite the fact that the President in approving the com-
promise had expressed this request. 81 The dissent disregards the facts
as to what the public safety required and the findings of the trial court
as to the absence of civil strife or obstruction of the courts in their or-
dinary functions. It should be remembered that at the time of the trial
of the Duncan case the criminal as well as the civil courts were in the
full exercise of their powers, trying thousands of cases after December
7, 1941. No reason was suggested in the dissent why the civil courts
which were actually trying cases involving major crimes could not en-
force any regulations that were promulgated by the General pursuant
to the act of Congress authorizing them. The military authorities were
adamant in clinging to the last degree to their assumed powers.
A month after the decision of the Supreme Court the Secretary of
War, prompted by radio broadcasts involving the exercise of military
authority in Hawaii, wrote a letter of explanation to Representative
Walter G. Andrews, dated March 25, 1946, which the Representative
inserted in the Congressional Record. Secretary Patterson in his letter
said:
"The Army did not in any sense oust or overthrow the civil gov-
ernment of the Territory. The civil authorities of the Territory
continued for the most part to function as before, their authority
supported and assured by martial law." So
The Secretary went on to state, "The War Department, of course,
accepts as settled law the decision of the Supreme Court in the Duncan
84. Record, p. 77.
85. On the relaxation of military control after March 10, 1943, the governor testified,
"Nothing has been relinquished as far as I know, and we have taken no action." Record,
p. 892.
86. 92 CoNG. REr. A1699 (1946) ; but see the statement of a better informed observer,
District Judge J. Frank McLaughlin, 92 CoNG. Rwc. A4930-4 (1946).
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and White cases and will follow it with circumspection." In his letter
the Secretary in defense of the army's actions in Hawaii quotes at
length from the opinion of the circuit court of appeals in the Zimmer-
man case, which was mooted by a release of the prisoner simultaneously
with the filing of the petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court. 8"
Secretary Patterson does not quote from the decision of the Supreme
Court in the Duncan case and his statements "that the Army did not
in any sense oust or overthrow the civil government" and that "the
civil authorities of the territory continued for the most part to function
as before" disclose a lack of knowledge of the facts and, what is even




It probably will be years before the historian of the future can clearly
appraise the motives and causes that led the Army to pursue the course
it did in Hawaii. It is inconceivable that those in high places in the War
Department were not cognizant of the fact that the regime erected in
Hawaii superseding the civil government was not only illegal but con-
trary to our most cherished traditions of the supremacy of the law. It
is readily understandable that military personnel not familiar with the
mixed peoples of Hawaii should have certain misgivings concerning
them. However, the conduct of the populace on December 7 and there-
after should have put these military doubts at rest. To be sure it took
some time for the military authorities to assure themselves that the
civil population was all that it seemed-a loyal American community.
What is not understandable is why the military government was con-
tinued after several years had elapsed and the fears of the most suspi-
cious had been allayed.
After bases which the Japanese held several thousand miles west of
Hawaii were captured by our forces it was clear that there could be no
invasion of Hawaii. Why then was the regime continued? A possible
explanation may have been military fears that, having assumed a ficti-
tious title of military governor 8 and having erected a military govern-
ment without legal sanction, the army would lose prestige if it were to
admit its error.
A military government is essentially like any other form of bureau-
cracy. Its tendency is to expand, not liquidate. In the matter of rank,
for example, if a military government has sufficient subordinate per-
sonnel then of course it can justify the creation of a certain number of
87. Zimmerman v. Walker, 319 U.S. 744 (1943).
88. The title of "military governor" was dropped on the eve of President Roosevelt's
visit to Hawaii. See General Orders No. 63, July 21, 1944.
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lieutenants, captains, majors, colonels and generals. On the other hand,
if the activity should decline with declining need, that would require
a reduction of personnel and rank. The reluctance of the military
governor's office to reduce its size and power is not peculiar to the mili-
tary. However, there is one important difference between a civil and
a military bureaucracy. If the action of a civil official is too arbitrary
or too -ide a departure from either statutory or regulatory authority,
then the courts will review the matter, whereas in the case of a military
government, as Justice Black pointed out, all power is centered in one
person, and the individual affected by the operation of such a govern-
nent is powerless to have his case reviewed by anyone since he must
turn to the very person he claims as his oppressor and ask for relief from
the oppression.
II
On March 1, 1946, nunc pro tunc as of November 1, 1944, Circuit
Judge Stephens filed a dissenting opinion in the Duncan case. 11 In a
preliminary statement, Judge Stephens explained that he had reached
the conclusion that the judgment should be affirmed and had distri-
buted an opinion to his colleagues on the circuit court of appeals, but
because the war was still in progress he had concluded that a dissent-
ing opinion held more possibility of harm than of good and had accord-
ingly withheld it. The opinion contains an exhaustive discussion of
the problems presented and it is only to be regretted that his dissent
was not made known when the case was disposed of in the circuit court
of appeals. Surely we are sufficiently strong as a nation to sustain the
impact of a judicial opinion even though it be critical of the military
arm of our government during time of war.
Even though a particular decision may be considered ill-founded as
a matter of law or unfortunate as a matter of policy it would be far more
unfortunate to suppress conflicts among members of our courts. Jus-
ices Murphy and Rutledge did not hesitate to express themselves in
the Yamashita case. 90 There are some who hold the view that dissent-
ing opinions shake the confidence of the people in the judicial system
and who long for the return to the days when dissenting opinions were
less frequent and unanimity appeared to be a prime judicial objective.
Although it is desirable from many standpoints that dissents be con-
fined to a minimum, it does not appear desirable where large issues are
at stake that a dissent should be avoided simply to portray a solidarity
of judicial opinion which is unreal.
The holding of the Supreme Court may be summarized as follows:
(1) The Federal Constitution and particularly the Bill of Rights
89. Ex parte Duncan, 153 F.2d 943 (C. C. A. 9th, 1946).
90. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 26, 41 (1946).
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apply in the Territory of Hawaii as elsewhere in the United States;
whether Congress can in any way limit their territorial application
remains, technically, an open question.
(2) Section 67 of the Hawaiian Organic Act does not authorize the
trial of civilians before military tribunals.
(3) After a declaration of martial law every act of the military com-
mander in pursuance of the declaration does not automatically become
lawful simply because the military commander has ordered it done.
Lawfulness of such a military act is reviewable in the courts and is
judged by whether or not the particular act in question was required
by the public safety.
The decision of the Court leaves unanswered several questions that
arise out of the army's rule of Hawaii; some of these may never be de-
termined, others may find their way into the courts. What, for ex-
ample, are the rights of citizens who were interned after the suspen-
sion of the privilege of the writ? 91 What are the rights of individuals
who paid fines imposed by military tribunals, the judgments of which
are now held invalid? 92 What are the rights of employers and employ-
ees under the Fair Labor Standards Act who paid and received wages
based upon the hours of overtime and prescribed by military orders and
approved by the administrator of the Wages and Hours Division? 11
The statement of questions such as those just enumerated indicates
the morass in which we become involved if we fail to adhere to the prin.
ciple basic in our government, namely, that we are all bound by the
Constitution and laws of the United'States and that no emergency
however great can justify ignoring them.
The phase of martial law passed on by the Court involves the most
extreme exercise of martial law powers-the supplanting of the civil
courts and the trial of civilians by military tribunals. This is the ulti-
mate in the exercise of such powers. At the other end of the scale lie
invasions of personal and property rights whose justification must also
depend on judicial balancing of the invaded rights against the acute-
ness of the emergency which is alleged to require their sacrifices.
91. Four cases are pending in the United States District Court for Hawaii involving
actions for damages brought by internees against the military commanders and others.
92. Provost courts levied and collected fines in excess of $1,000,000 during the period
of martial law. These monies less "operating expenses" were turned over to the Territory
of Hawaii for distribution among the several counties. Anthony, Martial Law, Military
Government and the Writ of Habeas Corpus in Hawaii, 31 Cidn,. L. Rzy. 477, 481
(1943).
93. Several cases are pending in the United States District Court for 1Hawaii in
which among other things the employer has interposed a defense against suits for over-
time based upon military orders and the wage schedule prescribed by the military gover-
nor; it would seem that payments' made pursuant to military orders constitute a defense
under § 9 of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 49, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (lay
14, 1947).
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